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He had been for some time a secret sympathizer of the notorious Holocaust revisionist historian Robert Faurisson. P final is not carried to the next word. Mom and Dad. Avendo una caffetiera. Dopo esser stato si allegro, qual tristezza!
I never belonged to a political party [This is not exactly the full story as we know that in his early 20s he was the president of a right-wing Catholic youth movement. I accepted the rectorship reluctantly and in the interest of the university alone.
The minister insisted that in this way my official relations with the Party and the governing organs would be simplified, especially since up until then I had no contact with these organs. After lengthy considerations, I declared myself ready to enter the Party in the interests of the university, but under the express condition of refusing to accept a position within the Party or working on behalf of the Party either during the rectorship or afterward.
The methods he employed were silence about much of his activity before and after , evasions, half-truths and outright lies. These documents are kept under lock and key by the Heidegger family and sympathetic scholars. One early scholar who did much original research in this area, Guido Schneeberger, found that he could not find a publisher for his book.
He eventually published his findings on his own in Nor has Heidegger shied away from out-and-out falsification of his own history. A well-documented example involves the republication of his lecture on metaphysics.
The full statement in the edition reads as follows: Some questioned why Heidegger chose to reprint this article in this exact form.
He responded: When an assistant helping him prepare the galley proofs for publication noticed this phrase, without any explanatory text, he asked Heidegger to remove it. Heidegger responded that he would not do so. Nevertheless, without telling his assistant, Heidegger did change the text a few weeks later.
Heidegger always maintained until his death that he never altered the text of this lecture. He reiterated this point in his Der Spiegel interview. In a later attempt to finally settle this controversy, a search was made of the original manuscript of the lecture. The page containing the controversial phrase was missing. An ironic chapter in this enterprise was played out by the deconstruction theorist, Paul De Man. De Man did much to publicize Heidegger among the American intelligentsia in the s.
He had been a Nazi collaborator in occupied Belgium during World War II and in that capacity had written some anti-Semitic articles for a Nazi-sponsored literary magazine. Beaufret, a former Resistance fighter, published several volumes of conversations with Heidegger before his death in For 35 years he was the most consistent defender of Heidegger in France. His credentials as a former Resistance fighter lent added weight to his defense of a former Nazi. Yet it seems that all along Beaufret had a hidden agenda.
He had been for some time a secret sympathizer of the notorious Holocaust revisionist historian Robert Faurisson.
Beaufret, like Faurisson, denied the existence of the Holocaust and more specifically of the gas chambers. In a letter sent to Faurisson, Beaufret was quoted as saying: Fortunately for me, this was done orally. As part of their public relations campaign Heidegger and his apologists were particularly keen to enlist the testimony of German Jewish philosophers who had themselves suffered under the Nazis. As to the world, he was served somewhat worse than Plato because the tyrant and his victims were not located beyond the sea, but in his own country.
He hoped to counsel the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysus. After a relatively brief experiment in seeking to temper Dionysus rule with a dose of wisdom, Plato returned to Athens, concluding that his attempt to put his theories into practice had been a failure.
For the attraction to the tyrannical can be demonstrated theoretically in many of the great thinkers Kant is the great exception. And if other philosophers did not follow in these footsteps, that can be explained by the fact that they did not take thinking as seriously as Heidegger.
She manages to make Heidegger into the victim who fell prey to the greatness of his thought. As if recognizing the absurdity of her position, Arendt shifts the argument from the body of her text into a long explanatory footnote. In this note she descends from the lofty rhetoric of her musings on Plato to some of the concrete issues surrounding the Heidegger affair.
Heidegger broke off all personal relations with Jaspers and his wife shortly after he became rector. It was only after the war that Heidegger tried to repair their personal relationship. One can only guess.
Perhaps there was an element of loyalty to her former teacher, a loyalty that was strained but not broken by her persecution at the hands of the Nazis and her years in exile.
At one point she found herself in a Nazi prison. Later when war broke out, she was trapped in Nazi-occupied France, from which she managed a daring escape. The most charitable interpretation of her grotesque defense of Heidegger is that she turned away from a truth that she could not face. Following the publication of his Heidegger and Nazism in October of , no less than six studies on the subject of Heidegger and Nazism were published in the following nine months.
This should not have been a surprise. The French debt to Heidegger extends from the existentialism of Sartre in the early postwar period to the more recent waves of structuralism, post-structuralism and deconstruction associated with Claude Levi-Strauss, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. One could, broadly speaking, break down the type of responses to Farias into three main categories. The first is the unconditional defense of Heidegger by his most orthodox keepers of the flame.
This group is represented by Francois Fedier, who, since the death of his teacher Beaufret, has been the most consistent defender of Heidegger in France. Such thinking has become a common stock in trade of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and their followers. The notion that Nazism is just another expression of Enlightenment universalism has recently been expressed by the Americans Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg.
However, Lacoue-Labarthe then seeks to rescue Heidegger by claiming that the post Heidegger who had overcome metaphysics and humanism, was free from any Nazi blemish. Weighing in on the French debate from the other side of the Rhine was the long-time Heidegger interpreter Hans-Georg Gadamer. P erhaps the most curious and damning recent defense of Heidegger came not from France but from Germany. Ernst Nolte, a historian and long-time friend of the Heidegger family, published a biography of Heidegger in , Martin Heidegger: Politics and History in His Life and Thought.
Prior to the publication of this book, Nolte was already notorious as a revisionist historian of the Holocaust and apologist for Nazism. Nolte has to be given his due as he was much more consistent and far more intellectually honest than some of the French defenders of Heidegger.
To Nolte Nazism was a necessary response to Bolshevism and Heidegger, by turning to Nazism, was merely responding to the call of historical necessity. Nolte even goes so far as to defend the Holocaust as a defensive measure made necessary by the hostility of world-Jewry to the National Socialist regime.
This fertile image, introduced by Hannah Arendt, is turned on its head by Nolte. Doubtless he did not wish to let a Jew get in the last word here. Between Good and Evil, first published in English in Once again, we are presented with a schizophrenic division between Heidegger the man and the philosopher. It is no longer tenable to deny these facts. While avoiding the excesses and logical gymnastics of Lacoue-Labarthe and other deconstructionists, Safranski seems incapable of making any essential judgment about his subject.
In its own way, this book is another contribution to the cover-up. To him, as to Adorno, Auschwitz is a typical crime of the modern age.
It has nevertheless met with largely positive reviews. This sufficed to show him that he had overestimated National Socialism. After World War II, he explained, imaginatively albeit monomaniacally, that Americanization, modern technology, the trivialization of life and the utter forgetfulness of Being four names, he thought, for the same phenomenon were irreversible.
What Safranski does say is that over a period of several years following his resignation as rector, Heidegger gradually loosened his involvement with Nazism, without cutting them completely until It turns out that Heidegger has defenders beyond the legion of French deconstructionists.
Rorty represents a tendency that has emerged in recent years among American pragmatists, a tendency that has tried to amalgamate pragmatism with elements of continental philosophy. In his capacity as something of a public spokesman for American pragmatism, Rorty has above all sought to enlist the followers of Heidegger to his cause. In the following section we will briefly examine the philosophical basis for this curious amalgam of two seemingly disparate traditions.
But lots of Germans who were dubious about democracy and modernity did not become Nazis. Heidegger did because he was both more of a ruthless opportunist and more of a political ignoramus than most of the German intellectuals who shared his doubts.
By this time, we have become quite familiar with this argument. In contrast, since the beginning of the s the discussion has continued unabated in the United States, Great Britain and other English-speaking countries. In fact, three separate books have appeared on the subject since We will comment on this book in the next section. Univeristy of California Press, , p. Safranski, p. Richard Rorty, Rev. Philosophical Papers, vol.
Cambridge University Press, , p. Julian Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism. History, Philosophy and Mythology. We are posting today the concluding part of a series on the life and work of twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Prior to a discussion of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger it seems necessary to dispose of a possible objection.
This objection can be expressed as follows: When stated in this way, the absurdity of this mode of thinking becomes self-evident. The problem with this type of reasoning is that it takes what is a partial truth, that indeed a thinker does in some way reflect the man and his times, and transforms this insight one-sidedly into an absolute dictum such that it becomes as false as it is true.
In general, the relation between a thinker and his action is far too complex to be summed up in a well-phrased maxim. At the same time, we must reject the opposite, equally one-sided judgment, one that has been championed by Heidegger apologists, that there is no relation between a thinker and his politics.
The proponents of this viewpoint often bring up the example of Gottlob Frege, a vicious anti-Semite whose politics apparently had no bearing on his technical work on logic. It would be particularly surprising to find a discordance between the political activity of a man such as Heidegger and his theorizing, knowing that his theorizing was itself intimately concerned with personal and political activity.
Were we to follow either of these false paths in relation to Heidegger, we may feel vindicated in our judgment of the man and his politics, but we would miss an opportunity to learn something about how his philosophy influenced or was in turned influenced by his politics. In particular we would be negligent in our responsibility to account for a most remarkable phenomena of fin-de-siecle bourgeois thought—namely, how is it that a philosopher who has been called by many the greatest thinker of the twentieth century was in fact a Nazi?
What does this conjuncture say about the kind of philosophy practiced by Heidegger and his followers? Most important of all, what does this say about the state of cultured opinion at the dawn of the new millennium? Broadly speaking, Heidegger appears within the framework of the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Philosophically, both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution had its most profound expression in the work of George Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel.
Hegel sought to overcome what he viewed as the one-sidedness of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution while at the same time defending their work as historically necessary for the emergence of modern bourgeois society.
Marx follows Hegel as a defender of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Marx however also recognized that the ideals of the French Revolution—liberty, equality and fraternity—are incompatible with a society based on private property. Henceforth these ideals could only be realized through the struggle for socialism. The year saw revolutionary movements break out throughout Europe.
The working class took its first steps as an independent political force. This had profound reverberations among all strata of society. Following the events of , the philosophical reaction against Enlightenment rationality becomes more conscious of its aims.
If the original opposition to the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century came from the monarchists, landholders and the church, the nineteenth century saw a new wave of opposition to the legacy of the Enlightenment emanating from those forces who felt most threatened by the emerging bourgeois society.
They looked back longingly to a mythical golden age in a medieval past. In Germany especially where the bourgeoisie had still to establish its political hegemony, the birth of political Romanticism found resonance among the peasantry and the middle class, which felt most threatened by the democratic revolutions that began to challenge the old order in the Europe of the s.
This played into the hands of the dukes, princes and landholders who had no desire to share political power. Consequent on the defeat of the revolution , the anti-rationalist tendencies expressed in the later philosophy of Schelling found fertile ground. The promise of the French Revolution, which seemed to inaugurate a new era in human history, was transformed into the nightmare of Prussian reaction. Instead of celebrating new possibilities, the prevailing spirit was one of resignation to a very narrowly circumscribed avenue of political practice.
The notion of freedom was redefined subjectively, as an inner state that can be maintained despite the vicissitudes of political life. This was combined with a deep pessimism toward the ability of human agents to create a more humane society. The name of Arthur Schopenhauer will forever be linked to this strand of subjective idealism. There was a fundamental change in social conditions after Whereas political Romanticism maintained a hostility to capitalism prior to , following the turmoil of that year, which saw the working class rise as an independent political force for the first time, the political thrust of Romanticism, particularly in Germany, was turned against the working class.
All that remained of the anti-capitalist impulse of the earlier period of Romanticism was a cultural critique of bourgeois mediocrity. Aristocratic and elitist values were championed as a safeguard against the threat of the great leveling out of society introduced by democratic and socialist impulses.
Needless to say a palpable fear of the working class was exponentially heightened following the events of the Paris Commune in , in which the working class for the first time briefly took power in its own hands. The mood of the German petty bourgeois immediately following the defeat of the Paris Commune was captured in a letter written by Nietzsche: Over and above the war between nations, that international hydra which suddenly raised its fearsome heads has alarmed us by heralding quite different battles to come.
He begins by unmasking the relations of power lurking behind claims to truth, a technique that was developed by the Enlightenment in its struggle against religious superstition, and turns this against the Enlightenment itself.
Nietzsche despised the egalitarian movements for democratic reforms and socialism that emerged in his time. He saw these modern political and social movements as threatening the aristocratic values for which great civilizations and great people the overman should strive.
It is in Nietzsche that the counter-Enlightenment finds its real voice. And it is to this tradition that we should look in situating the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger himself in fact recognized Nietzsche quite correctly as a kindred spirit.
But whereas Nietzsche saw himself as the prophet announcing the coming of nihilism, Heidegger sees himself as the biographer of a mature nihilism. He was influenced by the right-wing author Ernest Juenger, whose novels celebrated the steadfast, resolute soldier meeting his fate in battle.
The immediate philosophical tradition from which Heidegger graduated was inaugurated by Wilhelm Dilthey in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. The trend launched by Dilthey has come to be known as Lebensphilosophie Philosophy of Life or Vitalism.
Lebensphilosophie was not so much a specific philosophical doctrine as a certain cultural mood that affected broad areas of the intelligentsia. For its ideological armaments Lebensphilosophie borrowed the critique of scientific understanding from the debates that were raging prior to In his most important work, Being and Time, Heidegger sets out for himself the heroic task of retrieving the history of metaphysics.
Specifically, Heidegger maintains that modern man has forgotten the meaning of the question of Being. According to Heidegger, the subject-predicate logic which we use every day conceals the true meaning of what existence really is. The experience of Being was reified into a relation between a thing and its properties. Heidegger sees his task as the retrieval of the original meaning of Being which has been lost.
From this vantage point he goes to war against the entire history of Western philosophy following the Greeks. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger turns away from the history of philosophy which he views as hopelessly compromised by a flawed model of knowledge. His method of practicing philosophy also retraces the steps of Nietzsche. He abandons discursive argumentation that try to convince an unbiased reader by the force of their logic in favor of prophetic pronouncements and etymological sleight-of-hand that aim at overpowering the reader.
In his later philosophy, Heidegger will go even farther in his repudiation of the history of philosophy. He will claim that all philosophers after the pre-Socratics have been guilty of falsifying and concealing some kind of primal experience of Being. It is only when we live life at the extreme, and confront our own mortality, that we are able to set aside the inauthentic chatter of our day to day existence and come to terms with our true selves.
This theme, which Heidegger called our Being-towards-Death, is by no means new in the history of thought. It is closely related to the meditations of scores of religious writers from St. Augustine to Kierkegaard to Tolstoy. It is the soldier above all who is called upon to make a decision that will validate his life as he faces imminent death.
Seemingly, one can choose to be either a Nazi, as Heidegger himself did, or a member of the French resistance, as Sartre did, and still remain faithful to the terms of an authentic existence.
The completely empty character of the categories of authenticity and resoluteness have been the subject of much criticism. Given the accepted interpretation of Heidegger, this criticism is correct as far as it goes. However, a remarkable book that has just been published promises to turn upside down the body of received opinion on the philosophy of Heidegger. However, to readers of the French and English translations that circulated a generation or two later, this political content is completely obscured.
Fritsche maintains that whatever the merits of their own works, the existentialists misunderstood Heidegger. It relies on a very sophisticated historical and philological analysis of the text of Being and Time. After reconstructing the actual content of Being and Time, Fritsche compares it with the writings of two other notorious right-wing authors who were contemporaries, namely Max Scheler and Adolf Hitler.
Fritsche demonstrates that the political content of Being and Time and Mein Kampf are identical, notwithstanding the fact that the first book was written by a world renowned philosopher and the second by a sociopath from the gutters of Vienna. The fate whose call one must answer has been preordained by forces that are outside the scope of the individual.
Answering the call is therefore the very anti-thesis of any notion of freedom. In support of this thesis, Fritsche quotes the following passage from Being and Time: Fate does not arise from the clashing together of events and circumstances. The point is not how to create or break fate [which would be a typical existentialist interpretation.
Rather, the problem is whether a Dasein accepts, opens itself for, hands itself down to, subjugates itself to, or sacrifices itself to fate—which is what authentic Dasein does—or whether a Dasein denies fate and continues trying to evade it—which is what ordinary, and therefore inauthentic Dasein does. For Heidegger, fate had a definite political content. The fate of the patriotic German was identified with the Volksgemeinschaft, a term that was used polemically by the Nazis to denote a community of the people bound by race and heritage.
The idea of a Volksgemeinschaft was, in the right-wing literature of the time, often counterposed to that of Gesellschaft, a reference to the Enlightenment notion of a shared community of interests based on universal human values.
Continuing his analysis of authenticity, Fritsche comments: In the next step authentic Dasein realizes that its heritage and destiny is the Volksgemeinschaft, which calls it into struggle…. After this, authentic Dasein hands itself down to the Volksgemeinschaft and recognizes what is at stake in the struggle…. Finally, authentic Dasein reaffirms its subjugation to the past to the Volksgemeinschaft and begins the struggle, that is, the cancellation of the world of inauthentic Dasein. It entails the destruction of bourgeois democracy and its institutions, the persecution and murder of socialists, the emasculation of all independent working class organizations, a concerted and systematic attack on the culture of the Enlightenment, and of course the persecution and eventual elimination of alien forces in the midst of the Volk, most notably the Jews.
Fritsche has shown, however, that the early philosophy was anything but voluntarist. Rather, as Fritsche has demonstrated, we do not so much transform our destiny as find what it is and submit to it.
Thus, the sense of resignation is already there in the early philosophy. The transition therefore in the later philosophy is hardly as radical as it has appeared. A strikingly parallel conception can be found in the work of another contemporary intellectual who evinced sympathy for Nazism, the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung.
Lecturing in , Jung provides the following account of the relation between individual volition and our collective fate: The powerful factor, the factor which changes our whole life, which changes the surface of our known world, which makes history, is collective psychology, and collective psychology moves according to laws entirely different from those of our consciousness.
The archetypes are the great decisive forces, they bring about the real events, and not our personal reasoning and practical intellect…. Sure enough, the archetypal images decide the fate of man. Rather, what it does demonstrate is a shared outlook deriving from a common ideological source. This common substratum is the Volkisch ideology that had been gestating in Germany for a century prior to the development of Nazism.
Whereas the philosophers of the counter-Enlightenment paved the way for Volkisch ideology, an eclectic assortment of ideologues were its actual authors. These moods resonated among those social forces that found themselves increasingly displaced and marginalized by the industrialization of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The rise of Volkisch ideology expressed the fears of peasants, artisans and landowners squeezed between the pincer movements of the bourgeoisie and the working class.
Heinrich Riehl , a man who left no trace in any history of philosophy text, was a seminal theorist of Volkisch ideology. His book Land und Leute [ Places and People] argued that the inner character of a people is completely intertwined with their particular native landscape. The historian George L. This group was a part of the contemporary population which could never sink roots of any permanence. In its ranks was the migratory worker, who lacking native residence, could not call any landscape his own.
There was also the journalist, the polemicist, the iconoclast who opposed ancient custom, advocated man-made panaceas, and excited the people to revolt against the genuine and established order. Above all there was the Jew, who by his very nature was restless. Although the Jew belonged to a Volk, it occupied no specific territory and was consequently doomed to rootlessness. These elements of the population dominated the large cities, which they had erected, according to Riehl, in their own image to represent their particular landscape.
However, this was an artificial domain, and in contrast to serene rootedness, everything it contained, including the inhabitants, was in continuous motion. Among the working masses, admittedly, the despair was occasioned by their socio-economic situation. Among the intelligentsia, however, that mood of nihilism and despair from whose subjective truth Heidegger proceeded, which he conceptualized, clarified philosophically and canonized as authentic, created a basis favourable to the efficacy of Hitlerian agitation.
A third ideological building block of German fascism was the pseudo-science of racial theory rooted in a crude biological determinism. For one thing, the philosophical traditions from which biological racial theory derives, Social Darwinism and mechanistic reductionism, were anathema to the tradition of Lebensphilosophie from which Heidegger emerges.
Lebensphilosophie, particularly in the hands of its later practitioners, stressed the difference between Life and the natural sciences. With Heidegger, it develops a distinctly anti-scientific animus. If we follow this line of thinking, we would be attributing entirely too much significance to the role of biological racial theory for Nazism.
Whatever philosophical differences Heidegger may have had with Alfred Rosenberg, he was more than willing to attend international conferences as a representative of the Third Reich and sit on the same dais with Rosenberg and his ilk.
These were merely political crimes, of the sort committed by many thousands of yes-men. Perhaps his crime against philosophy is more fundamental. Through it he contributed in no small degree to the culture of barbarism that nourished the Nazi beast.
Danse Macabre: This is an extraordinarily complex subject to which we can hardly do justice in the scope of this presentation.
We wish simply to sketch the epistemological kinship, despite the historical differences, between Heidegger and his contemporary sympathizers. What has characterized the postwar intelligentsia in the West has been the wholesale abandonment of any identification with Marxism, humanism or any vestige of Enlightenment rationality.
The hopes of a generation of radical intellectuals were trampled underneath the weight of the failed revolutionary movements of the late s and early s. It would be hard to underestimate the impact on the French intelligentsia in particular of the failure of the revolutionary upsurge of May-June Legions of former left intellectuals began a wholesale retreat from the Enlightenment vision of an emancipatory rationality.
Their spirit of despair was summed up by the late Jean-Francois Lyotard, the founder of postmodernism: It can find expression in reactive, even reactionary, attitudes or in utopias—but not in a positive orientation that would open up a new perspective. In the s and s he was on the editorial board of the radical journal Socialisme ou Barbarie. He was an active participant in the events of May This is where the Heidegerrians, postmodernists, deconstructionists and neo-pragmatists find a common ground.
Heidegger provided the anti-foundationalist approach of Derrida, Rorty and others with a systematic critique of the history of philosophy. But the Enlightenment thought, rightly, that what would succeed religion would be better. In describing the malaise that has passed over Western thought Rorty writes: The warm reception for Derrida and French postmodernism in the United States can be explained by a series of developments in the past three decades that in many ways parallels the experiences of the French intelligentsia.
We have in mind the disillusionment that occurred when the heady days of protest politics of the s and early s gave way to the constricted cultural and political landscape of the Reagan administration.
At best, we are told to look at the work of poets and other artists whose intuitive aesthetic view of the world is offered as a new paradigm of knowledge. We can discern a similar trend in the works of the postmodernists and neo-pragmatists. Derrida for instance has sought to redefine the philosophical enterprise as a form of literary text. It is but a variation of the claim that immediate intuition provides a surer basis for knowledge than the mediated sequence of concepts that brings particulars into relation with universals.
In his own time, Hegel had to respond to the intuitionists who opposed critical thought. We have not so much overcome the history of metaphysics, as we have regressed to a period in the history of thought prior to the emergence of metaphysics, prior to the differentiation of science from myth and religion. Such triviality comes from thinking that is supposedly in tune with being and reveals itself as something supremely noble.
Such triviality is the sign of that classifying thought, even in the simplest word, from which Heidegger pretends that he has escaped: Among these one could mention the following: Rational discourse is incapable of encompassing the complexities and nuances of post modern society.
The fact that such a statement is itself an example of rational discourse and is therefore self-refuting does not seem to bother proponents of this view. The notion of progress cannot be demonstrated in history. The circumflex accent A is placed over a, e, i, 0, u, to give to these letters a long and broad sound.
A is pronounced like a in mass. A like a in bar, far. E nearly like u in bud, and frequently silent at the end of polysyl- lables. E like a in fate. E like ai in pair. E nearly like e in there. The exact French, sound of this letter is not found in English ; the nearest is oo in moon. U is the u with a prolonged sound. T, see y id diphthongs. A vowel surmounted by an accent cannot form a diphthong with an- other vowel, but must be pronounced separately.
A vowel surmounted by a diaeresis - follows the above rule. Ai is like a in fate. When the diphthong ai is followed N by s, d, or t, it assumes a broader sound, resembling the French e, or ai in the English word pair. Au is nearly like oh! Eu approaches the sound of u in tub. In eu, had; yeus, etc. Ie like ee in bee. Oi is nearly like wa in was.
Ou like oo in cool. TJa, ue, ui and uo have no corresponding sound in English. T, when initial, when coming between two consonants, or when form- ing a syllable of itself, has the sound of the French i. The words, pays, country; passage, landscape; paysan, peasant, are pro- nounced pe-is, pe-isage, pe-isan. The combination of the vowels with the consonant m or n, produces what the French call le son nasal, the nasal sound.
When the consonant m or n is doubled, or is immediately followed by a vowel, the nasal sound does not take place. The syl- lables in and im in the words innocent and immobile are pronounced as in English ; the syllabic division of i-nu-ti-le and i-nou4 will explain the reason of the absence of the nasal sound in those words.
Am, an, em and en are pronounced anh nearly like an in pant. En final is sometimes pronounced like en in then. Edera, Eden En in the third person plural of verbs is silent. Im and in are pronounced somewhat like an in crank. JJm and un are pronounced somewhat like un in hunting.
A final consonant is generally silent. The letters c, f I, r, however, when final, are generally pronounced. The final consonant of a word is generally carried to the next word, when that word begins with a vowel or an h mute. For illustrations and exceptions, see the several letters. B initial is pronounced as in English. In the middle of words, and at the end of proper names, b is sounded. When b is doubled, only one of these letters is pronounced.
G has its proper sound k before a, o, u, I, n, r. Ch is pronounced like sh in she. Ch is pronounced like k in a few words derived from the Greek. C final is sounded, except when preceded by n. C preceded by n is silent. C is pronounced like g in second, second; and its derivatives, as seconder. C final is seldom pronounced upon the next word. D has the same sound as in English. D is silent at the end of words, except in proper names ; as in David, David; also in the word sud, south; and in a few foreign words, as le Cid, the Cid; le Talmud, the Talmud, etc.
D final, coming before a word commencing with a vowel or an h mute, assumes the sound of t; un grand homme is pronounced gran tomme; coud-il, does he sewf vend-il, does he sell?
F is pronounced as in English. F final is generally sounded. G is always hard, that is, like g in game, before a, o, u. G before e and i always has the soft sound, that of s in pleasure. Gua, guo, gue, gui are pronounced gha, gho, ghe, ghi; i. The ue of gue final is mute, unless a diae- resis is on the e, as in eigne, hemlock. Gn is pronounced like ni in union. Guide, Vrogne, stag- nant, ignee, etc. G final takes the sound of k before a vowel or an h mute ; sang hu- main, human blood, is pronounced san kumain.
His mute or aspirate, h mute, having of itself no sound when pre- ceded by a word subject to elision, is treated as a vowel ; h aspirate is always initial. The breathing or aspiration is very slight, but not en- tirely absent, as is advanced by some grammarians. J" is pronounced like s in pleasure. Jour, day; Jamais, never. K sounds like k in English.
Z-in the combinations U, ill, not initial, but in the middle or at the end of words, has the liquid sound found in the English word brilliant Ex. LL in Sully has the liquid sound. The I marked as silent in the words above, is never carried to the next word.
For these letters in com- W bination with the vowels, see Nasal Sounds. Final consonants after m and n are generally silent. Mis silent in condamner, to condemn; automne, autumn. P is generally sounded as in English, p is however silent in bapteme, baptism; baptiser, to baptize; compte, account; dompter, to subdue; exempt, exempt; sept, seven; septieme, seventh. P final is silent. P final is not carried to the next word. Exceptions, trop, beaucoup. It is, however, mute in cinq, Jive, when followed by a word commencing with a consonant.
The French r is pronounced with greater force than the English. BB is pronounced like r. B final is pronounced when preceded by a, i, o, u. Monsieur, Sir. B preceded by e is generally sounded in monosyllables. B preceded by e is silent in words of more than one syllable. The final r of an infinitive is not often carried to the next word in conversation. In serious reading it is generally carried to the next word. S has generally the same sound as in English.
S between two vowels is pronounced as in the English words rose, prose. Excep- tions: Sc is pronounced as in English. S final is generally silent. S is carried to the next word when the word commences with a vowel or an h mute; it has then the sound of z: T is pronounced like t in table. T has the sound of the English c in cedar, in the combinations, tial, tiel, Hon, final or in the middle of words. Words in which these terminations are preceded by s or x, are excepted ; the t therefore in bastion, question, inixfron, etc.
T has the sound of c in cedar ; in the words inepfre, absurdity; minutfie, minutia; prophefte, prophecy; and in words ending in atic, derived from the Greek, and having in English the termination cy, aristocratfie, democrafie, etc. In other words ending in tie, and in those ending in tie, and tier, the t has its proper sound.
TJi always sounds like t alone. T final is generally silent. Ex- ceptions: T in et, and, is always silent. W which is found only in foreign words, is pronounced like v. TTurtemberg, TTestphalie. In a few other words it has the pronunciation of the English w. X initial, which in French is only found in a few words, is pronounced like gz. X following an initial e, and preceding a vowel or an h, is also sounded like gz.
X not following an initial e, but coming between two vowels, sounds like ks. X final is generally silent. Ex pri , price; croia: Aja , Sty a;, etc. In Aia: The a; of si , dia? X when carried to the next word sounds like z. Z sounds as in the English words zinc, zone.
In Mete, Sues, etc. Z final is generally carried to the next word, when that word com- mences with a vowel, or an h mute. The German Alphabet consists of twenty-six letters, which are represented as follows: Besides these, there are, in German, double vowels, modified vowels, diphthongs and compound consonants, as: Simple and Double Vowels.
A always lias the same sound, and is pronounced like a in the English words, farthing, father, aunt, are ; never like a in ball, name, or hat. Aber, hdbe, J. Aa is pronounced in the same manner, but longer. Aaa, baar, Haar. E has two different sounds, but both may be either long or short.
The broad one like a in the English word share. This is also the sound of the double ee. Heer, Meer, Kafifee, Seele. When the e is followed by two consonants or a double one, it is con- sidered to be short ; this being the case with all the vowels.
E at the end of a word, or in an unaccented final syllable, is very short. I has only one sound, the same as in sister, milk. This vowel appears in some words lengthened by e mute after it, as in field. In some words, however, the letter i belongs to the first syllable and e to the following one ; in this case i and e are of course pronounced separately. This does not take place in the final syllable of foreign words where the accent falls on the last syllable.
Ofen, Hof, Boden, Rohr, Rose, los. When followed by two conso- nants, it is short, and sounds nearly like the English o in off, loss. Double o oo is always long and has the first sound. Moos, Loos. Nwll, Bwnd, Hwnd, Hwld. Double u does not occur. T appears as a simple vowel only in foreign words, where its sound does not differ from that of i.
Cypern, Lysias, etc. Preceded by e, it will be mentioned with the diphthongs. The German y is never used as a consonant. Modified Vowels. The vowels a, o, u are, properly speaking, simple ones, as well as the foregoing ; but as a peculiar character for them is wanting, they are represented as modified a, o and u, and printed with a small e above, as a, 6, u, or a, o, u.
At the beginning of words the capital letters being too tall are followed by the e, as: Ae, Oe, Ue. In writing, the e over the small letters has been corrupted into two dots, as a, 6, u, which are also now used in printing. The sound of this vowel, when long, is nearly the same as ai in fair the French e. Kase, gramen, Bader, wahlen. When short, the sound becomes rather slender, almost as in fat.
When sharp, this vowel approaches the English sound in but or come; it is very like the French eu in seul or jeune. When long, there is no sound answering to it in the English language; the nearest to it is, perhaps, bird, heard, etc. Men, Kohler, Hdhle, Me, B gen. The English have nothing corresponding, to this sound. It is exactly the French u in russe, sur, etc.
Ai, which occurs only in a few substantives, is pronounced almost like the English i in fire, sky, but a little broader, the a predominating. Ay is no longer used in German, except in a few proper names. Au, like the ou in house, sound. Aeu, resembles somewhat the English oy, in boy; but whilst here the o predominates in the German au, the a is more distinctly heard ; again, the second half is not so open as i, but more like u the French u.
Hawser, Bazzme, trawmen, Brcmte, as if spelt Haftser, Baiime. M, has always the sound of the English i in mind. This practice is now abol- ished, and all words having the sound ei are mostly written ei.
The further practice of writing the verb sein, to be, in all its forms, with y, is gradually being discontinued. Eu, has the same sound as au ; it is not quite so broad as the English oi. Simple Consonants. B and D are pronounced as in English, but when they end a word or even a syllable, followed by another consonant, they are somewhat harder, and approach the sound of p and t. This letter by itself appears only in foreign words, and is pro- nounced, before a, e, i and y, like ts, the same as z.
Casar, Centner, Citrone, Cypern ; before the other vowels and consonants, hard, like k. T in words ending in ion, which are taken from the Latin, sounds like z ts , according to our pronunciation of this language. G ought always to have the hard sound like the English g in garden, glad, pig. It must, however, be mentioned, that in a part of Germany the g after each vowel is pronounced soft, sounding like ch.
H at the beginning of words is aspirated, as in English. Between two vowels the aspiration is so slight as to be scarcely heard. J yot corresponds with y consonant in you. K is like the English k. JR is pronounced shriller and with more emphasis than in English.
Its being placed at the beginning, middle or end, makes no difference. S is like the English s, and the distinction between hard and soft s like z is rather imaginary. Of course, double s is still harder and more hissing than a single s, because the sound is doubled, but the funda- mental sound of s should always be hard and hissing. W answers to the English and French v, but is somewhat more open the lips being less contracted than in pronouncing the English v. This sound requires particular attention.
TTein, wer, warm, wo, wild, ewig. W is never used at the end of words. Z is pronounced as ts in gets or nets. The sounds of the English j and w or wh do not occur in German. Double and Compound Consonants. There is nothing corresponding to this in English. It has two different sounds: When placed after a, o, u and au, its sound is a gut- tural one, and resembles the Scotch ch in Loch.
It is impossible to define it more clearly. The pupil must therefore refer to his teacher for the cor- rect pronunciation. The other sound which occurs after e, i, ei, a, o, au, eu and u, is a soft " palatal aspirate. At the beginning of words ch is pronounced like k. When ch is followed by s, they are pronounced together, like ks or a;. This, however, cannot be done in compound words. Ck appears at the end or in the middle of a word after a vowel, with the sound of double k as in English.
Ck is never allowed after a consonant ; to write starch, Wevck, Banck, etc. There are a few compound words in which even ck and k occur together. RiicMehr, DrucMosten, Dickkoipf. Ng sounds like the English ng in length. The same pronunciation is retained, when ng is followed by a vowel. In compound words, when the first ends in n, and the other begins with g, each is pronounced separately.
In German it is found in few words only. Quarz, quer, QuM, Qual, Quelle. Ph has the same sound as f, and occurs mostly in words of Greek ori- gin. Fpheu, Philosephie, Geographie, Adolph. Sch is like the English sh in ship. TJi must not be pronounced otherwise than as simple t; it never has the sound of the English th. When th stands in the middle or at the end of a word it indicates the length of the preceding vowel.
Tz is never ad- mitted after a consonant. Lens, tansen, Hers. Lentz, tantzen, stiirtzen, etc. The Italian Alphabet contains twenty-two letters pronounced follows: A is always sounded broad like a in alarm. E has generally a close sound as in the English words pen, fen, generous. But sometimes it is open, as m there. J is pronounced like double ee in sleep. J is always a vowel in Italian. At the end of a word it sounds like eg in the English word bee, each vowel pronounced separately.
In the middle of a word it is pronounced like y in the words yield, yonder, you. TJ always has the sound of oo, as in the English word cool.
C before a, o, u sounds like k. C before e, i sounds like ch in the English words child, cheek. In this case, when double c cc meets, the first takes the sound of a soft t. Ch before e or i is pronounced like k. G before a, o, u is pronounced as in the English words goblin, gunner. G before e and i has the sound of j or soft g. Giob, gio, giu, are pronounced dgia, dgio, dgiu, in one syllable, and the i has a faint sound.
Gua, gue, gui are pronounced gwa, gway, gwee. Gh is pronounced like g in give. Gl before a, e, o, u is pronounced hard. Gl before i has a liquid sound, as in the English words million, Ver- million. Gl is pronounced hard, as in English, when it precedes the vowel i followed by a consonant.
S in Italian has two sounds, the hard and the soft. Between two vowels it has generally the soft sound, as heard in the English word ease.
Accompanied by a consonant, or at the beginning of a word, it is always pronounced sharp, as in pulse. Sc followed by a, o, u is pronounced sk as in English. Sch is always pronounced like sk or like sch in the English words school, scholar.
Z has generally a soft sound, that of ts. Lasaro, Zbdiaco. Cardinal Numbers. Nine, io Ten. Thirty-two, etc. Seventy-two, etc. Nombres Cardinaux. Vingt-quatre, Vingt-cinq. Trente et un. Trente-deux, etc. Soixante et onze. Quatre- vingt-dix. Numeri Can Eins. Acht, Otto. Drei zehn. Neun zehn. Ein und zwanzig. Zwei und zwanzig.
Drei und zwanzig. Vier und zwanzig. Secbs und zwanzig. Sieben und zwanzig. Acht und zwanzig. Neun und zwanzig. Ein und dreiszig. Zwei und dreiszig. Ein und siebzig. Zwei und siebzig. Ein und neuuzig. Ninety-two, etc. A hundred. A hundred ahd one. A hundred and two, etc.
A thousand. Two thousand. Ten thousand. Ordinal Numbers. Two hundreth, etc. Cent-deux, etc. Deux cents. Trois cents. Deux mille. Dix mille. Cent mille. Un million. Nombres Ordinaux. Vingt-quatrieme, etc. Cent-deuxieme, etc. Deux-centieme, etc. Hundert und eins. Hundert und zwei. Drei hundert. Zwei tausend. Zehn tausend. Eine Million. Der, die, das erste. Vierundzwanzigste, etc.
Hundert und zweite, etc. Zweihunder tst e. Un milione. Humeri Ordinativi. Ventesimo primo. Ventesimo secondo. Ventesimo terzo. Ventesimo quarto. Centesimo primo. Centesimo secondo. Thousandth, etc. Millieme, etc. Moitie, demi. Sixieme, etc. Sixth, etc. Days of the Week. The Months. Les Mois. Le printemps. Sechstel, etc. Die Tage der Woche. I Giorni della Seti io Sonntag. Samstag or Sonnabend. Die Monate. I Mcsi. Der Fruhling. La primavera.
Der Sommer. Der Herbst. Der Winter. I have a house. Thou hast a room. We have a chair. You have a cushion. They have a carpet. Thou hadst curtains. He had a chimney.
We had bellows. You had a shovel. Past Definite. I had andirons. Thou hadst coals. High School Musical. As they reach for the stars and follow their dreams, everyone learns about acceptance, teamwork, and being yourself.. You Only Live Twice. A mysterious space craft kidnaps a Russian and American space capsule and brings the world on the verge of another World War.
James Bond investigates the case in Japan and meets with his archenemy Blofeld. The fifth film from the legendary James Bond series starring Sean Connery as the British super agent.. Jack Reacher. When a gunman takes five lives with six shots, all evidence points to the suspect in custody. On interrogation, the suspect offers up a single note: Thugs of Hindostan. After Porn Ends 3. A Good Day to Die Hard. Journey 2: The Mysterious Island. Ghostbusters II. Total Recall.
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